Friday, January 14, 2011

Lebanon, the U.N. Hariri Tribunal and the Crisis within Hezbollah

Lebanon’s national unity government fell last week owing to a crisis precipitated by the expected indictment by a U.N. tribunal of members of Hezbollah for the assassination of Lebanon's former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, in 2005. Western news analysis of developments leading up to and subsequent to this crisis have, in my opinion, strayed completely off the mark.

Regarding news analysis (forget intelligence assessments - this is not WikiLeaks), over the past week there were two items appearing in The New York Times, which attempted to summarize and make sense of events in Lebanon. In an op-ed entitled "Hezbollah's Latest Suicide Mission" (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/opinion/13cambanis.html?ref=opinion) published on January 12, 2011, guest op-ed contributor Thanassis Cambanis wrote:

"THE collapse of Lebanon’s government on Tuesday signaled the final stage in Hezbollah’s rise from resistance group to ruling power. While Hezbollah technically remains the head of the political opposition in Beirut, make no mistake: the Party of God has fully consolidated its control in Lebanon, and will stop at nothing — including civil war — to protect its position.

. . . .

Hezbollah, re-armed and resurgent after the war with Israel in the summer of 2006, has had a string of political and popular victories. The influence of its sponsors, Syria and Iran, has only grown. And talks between Syria and Saudi Arabia that might have stabilized the government fell apart this week.

Why, then, would Hezbollah change the political dynamic now?

Simply put, Hezbollah cannot afford the blow to its popular legitimacy that would occur if it is pinned with the Hariri killing. The group’s power depends on the unconditional backing of its roughly 1 million supporters. Its constituents are the only audience that matters to Hezbollah, which styles itself as sole protector of Arab dignity from humiliation by Israel and the United States."

Has the influence of Hezbollah's sponsor, Iran, indeed only grown, as claimed by Cambanis? As of last week, no.

In an article entitled "For Hezbollah, Claiming Victory Could Be Costly" (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/world/middleeast/14lebanon.html?_r=2&hp), published by The New York Times on January 13, 2011, Anthony Shadid wrote from Beirut:

"Hezbollah has evolved from a shadowy organization blamed for two attacks on the American Embassy and the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks here, killing 240 soldiers, into an expansive movement with an armed militia more powerful than the Lebanese Army and a sprawling infrastructure that delivers welfare to its Shiite constituency, Lebanon’s largest community. Over those decades, its political role has grown, as well, particularly when it has felt vulnerable, as was the case with the Syrian withdrawal.

Even its supporters acknowledge its vulnerability now. Not that it fears that the tribunal would try its members — the prospect of their arrest is almost impossible to fathom, given Hezbollah’s discipline. Rather, it is concerned about the impact of the indictments on its standing in the Arab world. Both it and its allies worry about the reach, too, of the tribunal, a body whose foreign backers (France and the United States) and supporters here (Mr. Hariri’s allies) have seen as serving their interests."

This news analysis only mentioned Iran once:

"Hezbollah, analysts say, had hoped for an agreement mediated by Syria — with Iran, Hezbollah’s ally — and Saudi Arabia, the patron of Mr. Hariri."

Although this analysis correctly observes that Hezbollah supports "a sprawling infrastructure that delivers welfare to its Shiite constituency", it fails to note where the funds for this infrastructure derive, i.e. Iran.

Neither of these two items from The New York Times relate to the recent antagonism which has developed between Hezbollah and Iran.

In an excellent article entitled "Iran said to have cut Hizbullah aid by 40%" (http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=199611), published by The Jerusalem Post on December 16, 2010, Yaakov Katz writes:

"Iran has cut the annual budget it provides Hizbullah by over 40 percent, stirring an unprecedented crisis within the Lebanese Shi’ite guerrilla organization.

. . . .

Iran has in recent years provided Hizbullah with close to $1 billion in direct military aid, but due to the impact of the recent round of international sanctions, the Islamic Republic has been forced to cut back on the funding. The money is used by Hizbullah to buy advanced weaponry, train and pay its operatives and establish military positions and sustain them throughout Lebanon.

The cuts in the budget has stirred tension between Hizbullah and its Iranian patrons, further fueled by disagreements between the top Hizbullah leadership and the Revolutionary Guard Corps officer who was appointed earlier this year to oversee Hizbullah operations on behalf of the Islamic Republic.

That officer is Hossein Mahadavi, and his official title is 'commander of Iran’s overseas division,' which in this case is Hizbullah.

Mahadavi is believed to maintain an office in Beirut and is a senior member of the Guard’s Al-Quds Force, which is responsible for Iran’s overseas operations.

. . . .

According to information that has reached Israel, Mahadavi has clashed with senior Hizbullah officials, including its Secretary-General Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, on critical issues pertaining to the group, which is refusing to accept the Iranian’s authority."

Bottom line: It's all about the money. Not only has the money provided by Iran to Hezbollah been used for weaponry, to train and pay operatives and to establish military positions, as observed by Katz, it has also been used by Hezbollah to support its social welfare infrastructure, as noted by Shadid.

In a nutshell: Without the funds to support this social welfare infrastructure, Hezbollah is on the verge of collapse, and hence the tension with Mahadavi.

Query: How does Hezbollah respond to this financial crisis that threatens it with bankruptcy? In desperation, does it stage a coup and fund itself from Lebanese government sources? Does it start a war with Israel and demand additional funding from Iran for its "heroism"? There is a good reason why the IDF is on alert in the north (see: http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=197405).

Additional query: Why has the U.S. delayed sanctioning the Lebanese banks through which Iranian funding has passed to Hezbollah? It would be simple to implement this strategy, inexpensive and bloodless, but sometimes common sense solutions go ignored.

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